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State debtor-creditor law serves two purposes. First, it provides the

remedial devices through which unpaid creditors may satisfy their claims
out of the nonexempt property of their debtors., Second, where two or

more people assert claims against the property of a debtor, it regulates
the competition. Where, as is usual, the debtor's nonexempt property
will not satisfy all claims, state law determines the order of priority in
which these claims may be satisfied out of each item of property. In
ordering the priorities, the age-old statutory objectives are: (1) avoiding
* Professor of Law, University of Florida. In the Fall of 1995, Paul Singerman, Chair
of the Business Section of The Florida Bar appointed the Special Committee on Post-Judgment
Creditors' Remedies, chaired by Michael Williamson. I have served as Reporter for the Special
Committee. As I write, the Committee continues to consider a wide variety of proposed
amendments to Florida debtor-creditor law. Execution lien law is one of the areas in which
changes are being considered. During these discussions I have learned a great deal from the
many dedicated lawyers on the Committee, for which I am grateful. Here, I do not purport to
speak for the Committee. The opinions I offer are my own.
My special thanks to David Tetrick Jr., class of '96, whose excellent seminar paper taught me
a great deal about execution lien law.
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unfair surprise to innocent parties, and (2) encouraging and rewarding
diligent creditors. It is my thesis that Florida execution lien law does a
poor job of promoting both of these objectives. In this essay, I discuss
the defects in the operation of Florida execution lien law, and argue that,
taken together, these defects justify adopting a significantly different
approach. Accordingly, I also discuss an approach that I believe does
promote the above objectives.
I. CURRENT FLORIDA EXECUTION LAW AND ITS FLAWS
The current Florida execution process dates back to medieval England. A creditor with a judgment may obtain a writ of execution from
the clerk of the court in which the judgment was entered. The writ
directs all sheriffs in the state to levy upon and sell sufficient tangible'
property to satisfy the unpaid balance of the debt. Although courts can
authorize multiple writs, normally only one writ is issued on a judgment.
Because sheriffs have authority to act only within their own counties, an
executing creditor must choose the county in which property of the
debtor is likely to be located. On choosing a county, the creditor then
delivers the writ to the sheriff, and here's where the medieval law enters
the picture. As at common law, delivery of the writ to the sheriff creates
an inchoate lien on all leviable personal property of the debtor within
the county.2 The creditor then leaves the writ in the possession of the
sheriff until the writ is satisfied, or, if never satisfied, until the judgment
expires twenty years later.3 The inchoate lien becomes a true lien only
when the sheriff levies on something, and only on the property levied
upon and sold.4
As between the creditor and debtor, the inchoate lien is of no
consequence. It is only the actual levy that interferes with the debtor's
use and enjoyment of the property. Debtors frequently operate for years
unimpeded and probably unaware that their leviable property is subject
to any number of inchoate liens. The significance of the inchoate lien
lies in its role in ordering priorities among competing creditors and
others claiming an interest in the debtor's property. When the sheriff
levies on something, the inchoate execution lien matures into a true lien

1. Florida Statutes § 30.30 provides that a sheriff must levy whenever a writ is delivered
to the sheriff. FLA. STAT. § 30.30 (1995). The types of property subject to levy include "[1]ands
and tenements, goods and chattels, equities of redemption in real or personal property, and stock
in corporations. . .

."

FLA. STAT. § 56.061 (1995). The sheriff may also levy on the "current

money" of a corporation. FLA. STAT. § 56.09 (1995).
2. See Love v. Williams, 4 Fla. 126, 134 (1851).
3. FLA. STAT. § 55.081 (1995).
4. See Love, 4 Fla. at 134.
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on the seized property that dates back to the moment when the writ was
delivered to the sheriff.5 It is sometimes inartfully said that the lien
becomes "choate" on levy. All claims to the levied-upon property
arising after the date of delivery to the sheriff take subject to the now
choate lien. Thus, the holder of the first delivered writ takes priority
over not only subsequent competing lien creditors, but also over
subsequent lenders who have taken a security interest or mortgage in the
property, subsequent purchasers, beneficiaries, decedents, and transferees
of any stripe.6 Any intervening party whose interest arises between the
date of delivery and the date of levy takes subject to the lien of the
eventually levying creditor.
Sixty years ago, most states were said to follow the lien-on-delivery
rule.' Dissatisfaction with this rule, however, has fueled a strong
nationwide movement away from it. Today, Florida is one of only
eleven states that retain some form of the common law rule.' Florida
should join those states that have discarded the lien-on-delivery rule
because it both fails to protect innocent parties and discourages diligent
creditors. I discuss these failings in order.
A. Failure to ProtectInnocent Parties:
The BFP Problem
The lien-on-delivery rule unfairly surprises innocent parties because
in practice inchoate liens attach to the debtor's assets largely in secret.
Accordingly, good faith purchasers and lenders frequently buy and lend
for value without knowledge of the lien, yet take subject to it. Even
buyers in the ordinary course of business, such as retail buyers, lose out
to the previously inchoate lien that becomes "choate" when the creditor
causes the sheriff to seize the property.9
5. In re Cone, 11 B.R. 925, 927-28 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
6. See Bank of Hawthorne v. Shepherd, 330 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Cone,
11 B.R. at 927-28.
7. "Most states accept the rule... that a lien exists at the time of the delivery of the writ
to the sheriff for execution." JOHN HANNA & JAMES A. MCMAUGHLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS

ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS 9 (3d ed. 1939).
8. Eight of these states follow the lien-on-delivery rule: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. §
16-66-112 (Michie 1987); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-52-111 (1997); Hawaii, HAW. REV.
STAT. § 651-41 (1993); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 5/12-735 (1993); Indiana, IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-1-34-9 (Bums 1986); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.120
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1942); Pennsylvania, DeAngelis v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.,
358 A.2d 53,55 n.1 (Pa. 1976); and the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 15-307 (1981).
Two others retain the even more archaic rule that the lien relates back to issuance of the writ.
They are: Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-1-109 (Supp. 1996); and Georgia, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-12-20 (1994).
9. See Cone, 11 B.R. at 927-28. One perverse possiblity, probably the kind only a law
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In states that have abandoned the lien-on-delivery rule, the BFP
problem has been the driving force. Impetus for change also has been
provided by secured transactions law, in which the problem has been
solved. Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),
good faith purchasers are protected in two ways from the surprise
assertion of a prior security interest. Buyers in the ordinary course of a
seller's business take free of all security interests, 0 and buyers not in
the ordinary course of business take free of security interests that have
not been perfected by filing." The fundamental U.C.C. policy of
protecting innocent buyers for value by requiring at the very least a filed
financing statement is well known to anyone conversant with commercial law.
Perhaps the most striking example of how the BFP problem has
caused states to retreat from the lien-on-delivery rule can be found in
the Delaware case law. In Flemming v. Thompson, 2 a judgment debtor
sold his mobile home to a dealer after a writ of execution had been
delivered to the sheriff. The dealer sold the mobile home to an innocent
buyer, who financed it through a Delaware bank. The trial judge,
consulting the Delaware statute providing that "[a]n execution shall,
from the time it is so delivered, bind all the goods and chattels of the
defendant "'33 had no difficulty ruling that first priority went to the
judgment creditor. 4 A stunningly unanimous supreme court disagreed,
holding that Delaware's enactment of the U.C.C. had implicitly repealed
the lien-on-delivery rule as to bona fide purchasers of goods, 5 and that
the judgment debtor had the power to transfer good title to the dealer.

professor would think up, is that the executing creditor could levy on property in the hands of
a buyer that it could not levy on in the debtor's hands. For example, normally, the inventory
lender to a retailer or manufacturer has a security interest in the inventory that has priority over
a previously docketed lien creditor. U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1995). This security interest is then cut
off when the goods are sold to a buyer in the ordinary course of the debtor's business. U.C.C.
§ 9-307(1) (1995). However, the sale does not cut off the execution lien. Thus, even though a
writ holder could not successfully levy on the inventory in the debtor's hands, the levy
immediately after sale would presumably succeed unless the buyer could somehow argue that
the priority of the inventory lender somehow sheltered the buyer. There is, however, no authority

for this.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
voidable

U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1995).
U.C.C. § 9-307(2) (1995).
343 A.2d 599 (Del. 1975).
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 5081 (1974).
See Flemming, 343 A.2d at 600.
Id. The court ruled that until the sheriff levies, the judgment creditor holds only
title. Id
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To this day, the Delaware statute remains unchanged on its face, 6
subject now to the judicial BFP exception.
The more common means of departing from the rule to protect BFPs
is by statutory amendment. In Maryland, for example, in 1973, the
legislature amended the execution lien statute expressly to provide that
"[a] writ of execution on a money judgment does not become a lien on
the personal property of the defendant until an actual levy is made."' 7
This change was later characterized as the third stage in the evolution
toward providing "greater protection to innocent third parties and greater
deference to the notion of notice to the world."' 8
In Florida, the rule has been severely criticized by both scholars and
judges. In 1979, Professor Murray of the University of Miami law
faculty surveyed the development of American execution lien law,
arguing forcefully that bona fide lenders and purchasers need protection
from Florida's "hidden lien."' 9 Additionally, my colleague, Professor
Williams, has been extremely critical of the rule.' Another commentator, Trawick, has stated: "Serious defects exist in Florida's execution
laws. The execution lien is a hidden lien on personal property. A good
faith purchaser for value has no protection from it.... The Uniform
Commercial Code, requiring actual seizure of property within its scope,
is much better."'" In the recent case of Crudele v. Accent Realty of
Jacksonville,22 a bona fide purchaser of contract rights for value was
left empty handed because a writ had been delivered to the sheriff prior
to the purchase. Judge Cope, concurring in the result, was moved
separately to "note that this case exemplifies a problem area in creditordebtor relations which may well call for reform."' Referring to the
criticisms of Murray and Trawick, Judge Cope stated, "Although... the
instant case [has been disposed of] within the parameters of existing
law, the experience of other jurisdictions suggests that our system could
be improved. As has been true in other jurisdictions, any significant
modifications would require legislative action."24

16. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10. § 5081 (1974).
17. MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 11-403 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
18. In re National Quick Print, Inc., 103 B.R. 107, 110 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989).
19. D.E. Murray, Execution Lien Creditors Versus Bona Fide Purchasers,Lenders, and
Other Execution Lien Creditors:Charles II and the Uniforn Commercial Code, 85 COMM. L.J.
485 (1980).
20. See infra note 28, at 21-23.
21. HENRY P. TRAWICK, JR., TRAWICK'S FLORIDA PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 27-3, at
411-12 (1988).
22. 541 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
23. Id. at 742.
24. Id. at 743.
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One of the most roundly criticized applications of the rule occurred
in Bank of Hawthorne v. Shepherd.2 There, one lien creditor had
delivered a writ of execution to the sheriff in Alachua County. Three
weeks later, Bank of Hawthorne took a security interest in the debtor's
automobile, probably signing the papers at the bank in Clay County, and
mailed its notice of lien to the Department of Motor Vehicles. The next
day, before the notice of lien was received by the Department for
notation of the bank's lien on the certificate of title, and thus before the
security interest was perfected, a second judgment creditor delivered a
writ of execution to the sheriff. The sheriff of Alachua County levied on
the vehicle and the court properly held that the first-delivered writ
holder had priority over the second writ holder and that the bank's lien
was superceded by both the first and second writ holder.26
Those who would retain the rule argue that the inchoate lien acquired
on delivery to the sheriff is not a secret lien. Sheriffs are required to
keep a docket of all delivered writs, 7 and a prospective buyer or lender
can check the sheriff's docket to see if any writs have been docketed
against the seller or borrower. Lawyers skilled in this area of the law
know this, and advise their clients to check the dockets in the counties
in which their prospective debtors keep tangible assets. Undoubtedly, in
large transactions, these clients, mostly banks, probably do. But, as Bank
of Hawthorne illustrates, banks often do not check. Moreover, checking
the docket is neither simple, nor foolproof. As Professor Williams has
pointed out while lamenting the Bank of Hawthorne result,
[T]he secured party would be required to check with the
sheriff of all counties in this state into which the collateral-by some remote chance-might be taken. But alas, even
if he does so-an unlikely practice in most cases considering the cost of such a search-a writ, delivered after his
check with any particular sheriff but before his security
interest is perfected, will subordinate the security interest as
it did in Bank of Hawthorne.8
Another reason why checking the docket is not foolproof is because
errors in docketing fail on the person checking. The inchoate lien arises
on delivery to the sheriff, not on docketing. If the sheriff fails properly
to docket, and the creditor produces the receipt proving delivery, the lien

25. 330 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
26. Id. at 76.
27. FLA. STAT. § 30.17 (1995).
28. WINTON E. WILLIAMS, 2 FLORIDA LAW IN SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL

PROPERTY ch. 4, at 20 (1980).
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is effective. 9 No wonder Professor Williams concludes that "a duty to
check for prior-filed writs is an unreasonable one to place upon a
secured party."' Following Bank of Hawthorne, the Legislature
realized that the lien on delivery rule competes improperly with
creditors taking security interests in motor vehicles and modified Florida
Statutes section 319.27(3) to permit a secured party to establish priority
in motor vehicles immediately by filing in the county tag agency office
prior to filing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). " This
modification provides no solace to creditors taking security interests in
other types of collateral, nor would it have protected the Bank of
Hawthorne from the inchoate lien that existed before the bank had taken
its security interest.
The argument that the lien is not a secret lien is weakest when the
third party acquiring an interest subject to the lien is an innocent
buyer-particularly a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Buyers
of personal property don't normally consult lawyers, don't usually know
about the possibility of inchoate liens, and don't consult the sheriff's
docket before buying. In buying motor vehicles, buyers will normally
look at the certificate of title, but this will not apprise them of inchoate
execution liens.
On the side of those who would retain the rule, the strongest
argument is this: While buyers occasionally get surprised when the
sheriff levies on property they have acquired from another, it doesn't
happen very often.32 Perhaps this is correct considering most lien
creditors have a difficult enough time finding the tangible assets of the
debtor, let alone finding assets that the debtor once owned and then
sold. Moreover, unless the asset is relatively valuable, such as a horse,
a boat, or an automobile, the writ holder may not think it worthwhile to
pursue the item into the hands of an innocent third party.
In response, I would argue that even if infrequent, when an innocent
buyer of a valuable asset does get surprised in this manner, the buyer
takes a big loss--one that the statute should not facilitate. Well

29. Another lien that will not be discovered on searching the docket is a federal execution
lien. Federal writs of execution attach and take priority in the same manner as state writs even
though they are not docketed or levied by Florida Sheriffs. See Sephus v. Gozelski, 670 F. Supp.
1552, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1987), vacated on other gounds, 864 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1989); Cone,
11 B.R. at 929.
30. See supra note 28.
31. FLA. STAT. § 319.27(3) (1995); see also In re Cleveland. 106 B.R. 707, 708 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 1987) (adopting the literal meaning of Florida Statutes § 319.27(3)).
32. Trawick surmises, "Perhaps the only reason it has not caused more problems is the
relatively low value of most personal property at execution sales." TRAWICK, supra note 21, §
27-3, at 411-12.
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conceived debtor-creditor law should protect against such severe
surprises if, as the great majority of states have now done, sensible
protective devices can be employed.
B. DiscouragingDiligent Creditors:
The Build-Up Problem
The second problem with the rule is that it can operate to discourage
diligent creditors from pursuing the assets of the debtor. In general,
creditors finding insufficient property to satisfy their claims tend to
leave their writs in the hands of the sheriff, hoping that the debtor will
acquire leviable property in the next twenty years. Of course, a debtor
who has failed to pay one creditor, often has failed to pay others. This
can result, over time, in a build-up of writs delivered to the sheriff
issued against the same debtor. The build-up consists largely of passive
writ holders who have long stopped paying attention to the affairs of the
debtor. The build-up also may include friendly creditors who have
obtained judgments against the debtor, either with or without the
debtor's cooperation, and established their position in line intending
never to levy.
If the debtor later acquires new property, the passive writ holders
never find out about it and the friendly ones don't act. If a new
judgment creditor comes along and delivers a writ to the sheriff along
with instructions for levying on the debtor's new property, the writ
holder is told two discouraging things. First, the creditor must pay the
sheriff's costs. For example, before the sheriff in Alachua County will
levy on motor vehicles in a known location, a "deposit" of $500 per
vehicle is required. Second, the value of the debtor's equity in any
property levied upon will go first to pay the sheriff's costs, and then to
satisfy all of the the previously delivered writs, including the interest
that has been accruing since the relevant judgments were entered. Any
value left over will then be distributed to the creditor causing the levy.
On hearing this news, and recognizing that execution sales frequently
bring stunningly low prices, the new creditor often gives up, leaving the
debtor to enjoy the property free of intrusion. The result is that a
sufficiently large build-up of passive and friendly writ holders has the
effect of insulating a debtor that may have leviable assets.33 Worse yet,
unpaid creditors who have not obtained judgments may be deterred even
from seeking them. This is the ultimate insulation-insulation from suit!
Perversely, the worst offenders, those debtors that have amassed the
33. Of course, if the new judgment creditor finds assets of substantial value, the prior liens
create no barrier because the levying creditor will still get paid. However, this happens only
rarely. More commonly, the new creditor chooses not to spend the time and money to look.
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largest collection of unpaid judgment creditors, receive the highest level
of insulation. Moreover, a friendly creditor with a large enough
judgment can provide nearly absolute protection for a period of twenty
years.
The crucial question is this: Granting that debtors are sometimes
insulated by the build-up of passive liens, how severe is this effect? Are
significant numbers of would-be diligent creditors discouraged or
deterred? Lacking conclusive empirical data, I will have to be satisfied
here with the inferences to be drawn from skimpy information.
To get a whiff of the magnitude of the build-up phenomenon, I
sampled the execution docket of the Alachua County Sheriff. Looking
at only the debtors whose last names began with the letters A, C, L, M,
T, and W, I counted the debtors according to the number of writs
docketed against them. I found that eighty-one percent of the debtors
had one writ docketed against them, twelve percent had two writs
docketed against them, and seven percent had three or more writs
docketed against them. A few had as many as ten. Viewed another way,
by subtracting the number of debtors from the total number of writs, I
determined that approximately twenty-one percent of the writ holders in
the docket were not first in line when they docketed their writs, and six
percent were third or worse. That is, twenty-one percent of the writ
holders went ahead and paid the docketing fee even though at least one
writ preceded them.
The docket does not show, of course, how many judgment creditors
chose not to pay the fee when seeing other writs ahead of them, nor
does it show how many creditors chose not to pursue judgment on
discovering the prior writs. Depending on how frequently this occurs,
the proportion of unpaid Alachua County creditors faced with the
discouraging news that they must first collect the debt of at least one
other creditor before they may collect their own may be as high as one
quarter, or perhaps even one-third. If the experience in Alachua County
is representative of the experience statewide, the build-up problem is a
significant one. Of course, Alachua County is a largely rural county
whose only significant city, Gainesville, is dominated by the University
of Florida. Extrapolating from that experience is obviously risky. While
it is hard to imagine what factors would cause the proportion of
previously docketed writs to differ significantly in an urban center from
the proportion in Alachua County, it is equally troublesome to expect
the proportion to be the same. What I can say is that these data suggest
that the lien-on-delivery rule significantly inhibits diligent creditors to
some extent, perhaps more in some counties than in others.
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C. What Does It Mean?
In light of the two flaws I have just discussed, a legislature writing
on a blank slate would probably not choose the current process. But,
since it has been in place for the better part of two centuries,' the
current process has, at least, the virtue of familiarity. Nevertheless, taken
together, the potential benefits of encouraging diligent creditors and
better protecting innocent third parties provide a forceful argument for
joining the large majority of states in departing from the lien-on-delivery
rule if a better rule can be devised.
II. How SHOULD FLORIDA EXECUTION LAW BE CHANGED?
Most states departing from the lien-on-delivery rule have adopted the
lien-on-levy rule. This protects third parties because the levy dramatically publicizes the attachment of the lien. Third parties are highly unlikely
to buy or lend against tangible personal property that has been siezed by
the sheriff.35 The lien-on-levy rule also encourages diligent creditors
because any asset they find that has not been levied upon is, by
hypothesis, not subject to a judicial lien of any sort. The asset may be
subject to a perfected security interest, which will reduce the debtor's
equity in it, but by levying the diligent creditor is assured of the highest
priority judicial lien.
In at least one respect, the lien-on-delivery rule is superior to the
lien-on-levy rule. Frequently, a levy on a significant asset is the signal
event that drives a struggling debtor into bankruptcy. If the debtor files
a bankruptcy petition within ninety days, the lien that attached on levy
will be voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy as a preferential transfer.36 The advantage of the lien-on-delivery rule is that the ministerial
delivery of a writ to the sheriff is rarely even known to the debtor, and
hardly a precipitating event. After delivery, the creditor may then wait
ninety days before attempting to levy. If, then, the levy causes a
precipitous bankruptcy filing, the lien will be invulnerable to preference

34. The first execution statute in Florida was enacted in 1828. See FLA. STAT. § 56.011
(1995) (statutory history).
35. Those that buy or lend against property not in the debtor's possession 'have only
themselves to blame. Sheriffs may sometimes levy yet leave the property in the hands of the
debtor by constructive seizure of the property. However, constructive seizure requires taking
steps to notify the public of the levy, such as posting signs, or other such steps. That is, the
sheriff must act in a manner toward the leviable property that, except for the protection of the
writ, would subject the sheriff to an action for trespass. The question of dominion over and
manual possession "is determined by the nature and condition of the property." Exparte Fuller,
128 So. 483, 484 (Fla. 1930).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
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attack.37 Of course, if the creditor has already found valuable assets, it
takes nerve to wait out the ninety days. One must hope the assets don't
somehow disappear during that period. It is, however, only the actual
disappearance of the asset that the creditor must fear. Having obtained
an inchoate lien, as long as the asset still can be located and levied
upon, the creditor is assured of priority over intervening interests.
I How can this advantage be retained while solving the BFP and buildup problems? One idea with superficial appeal is to keep the lien-ondelivery rule, but create statutory exceptions to it. As in Maryland, an
exception could be created to protect BFPs and innocent lenders, and the
diligent levying creditor could be given statutory priority over the liens
of the previously delivered writ holders." Any surplus from the
execution sale, after paying costs and the claim of the levying creditor,
could then trickle down to the other lien holders in order of their
deliveries to the sheriff. Attractive as this idea may be, it has one
enormous flaw. If the liens created by delivery could be primed by the
lien of a subsequent creditor who causes levy, then all liens created by
delivery would be voidable by the strong-arm-power of the trustee in
bankruptcy.39 This would be the case regardless of whether any actual
levy has occurred; a hypothetical levying creditor with the power to
defeat pre-existing liens is all the trustee needs.
A better solution, as suggested long ago by Professor Murray, is a
true statewide judgment lien on leviable personal property obtained by
central filing in the place where Article 9 financing statements are
filed.4" Like the current execution lien, the judgment lien would attach
prior to any levy, retaining the current potential for protection from the
37. See, e.g., In re Vero Cooling & Heating, Inc., 11 B.R. 359, 361 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1981).
38. This is the current Florida rule if a creditor makes otherwise unleviable property
available through proceedings supplementary to execution. See Salina Mfg. Co. v. Diner's Club,
Inc., 382 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1982).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994).
40. See FLA. STAT. § 679.401(1) for Florida's filing provisions. Motor vehicles, boats, and
airplanes aside, the two exceptions to central filing for financing statements on leviable property
occur where the security interest attaches to farm products and goods which are to become
fixtures. These financing statements must be filed locally. FLA. STAT. § 679.401(l)(a), (b). This

creates the slim possibility that a non-purchase money lender against such collateral might not
check the central file to discover any judgment liens that may have attached to the goods. The
properly recorded purchase money lender would take priority under Florida Statutes §
769.301(2). This problem could be solved by exceptifig these types of goods from the reach of
the judgment lien. In my view, this would be an overreaction. Non-purchase money loans against
farm products, most of which are perishable, or goods that are to become fixtures, most of which
eventually do become fixtures, must surely be quite rare. The chance of a subsequent levy
against such goods is rarer still. If such odd loans are made, it is not too much to expect the
lender to check the central file.
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debtor's bankruptcy. That is, if a levy more than ninety days after the
central filing were to drive the debtor into bankrutpcy, the lien would
not be vulnerable to the trustee's preference attack.
The key remaining questions are: (1) Would a statewide judgment
lien better protect bona fide purchasers and lenders? (2) Would a
statewide judgment lien better encourage and reward diligent creditors?
and (3) What, if any, are the additional advantages and possible
disadvantages of a statewide judgment lien? I take up these questions in
order.
A. BFPs and the Statewide Judgment Lien
on Leviable Personalty
A centrally filed judgment lien should go a long way toward solving
the BFP problem because of its increased notoriety and ease of access
compared to the inchoate lien of a locally docketed writ. Just as Article
Nine financing statements are today, these centrally filed liens would be
easily accessable by computer. Professional buyers and lenders routinely
would check the central file before committing to significant transactions. To further minimize the BFP problem, buyers in the ordinary
course of a seller's business should take free of the lien, as they
currently take free of the inventory lender's security interest.41 Certain
innocent buyers not in the ordinary course of a seller's business
(hereinafter buyers NOCB) also should take free of the lien, such as
buyers of non-vehicular consumer goods. The sale of these goods from
one consumer to another poses no severe threat to an unpaid judgment
creditor. The used lawn mower or bicycle is normally not worth the
trouble, and the baseball card collection is the kind of asset judgment
creditors rarely find. An innocent buyer who pays fair value should get
the nod here, while a buyer who pays less than fair value will be
vulnerable to fraudulent conveyance attack.
Not all ignorant buyers or lenders should take free of the lien,
however. Some should be required to check the file or assume the risk
of a filed judgment lien. Buyers NOCB of manufacturing equipment or
41. Buyers not in the ordinary course of business, such as buyers of consumer goods from
other consumers should be treated in the same manner as they are treated under Article Nine,
taking subject to any previous security interest that has been perfected by filing. FLA. STAT. §
679.307(2) (1995). This would give rise to the possiblity that an innocent purchaser for value
would take subject to the lien. In most instances, where the goods sold are of modest value,
there is little danger that the judgment lien holder will follow the property into the hands of the
buyer and levy on it. If the asset is of significant value, such as a horse, a boat, or a coin
collection, the buyer would do well to check the central file for both filed security interests and
judgment liens. The fact that in 40 years there has been no cry for modification to § 9-307(2)
suggests that few innocent non-ordinary course buyers have been harmed by this rule.
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motor vehicles provide a good example. Under Article Nine, such
buyers currently take subject to filed security interests, so they are, in
essence, required to search for them.' In doing so, they also will
discover the judgment lien, eliminating the need to provide them
protection.
Buyers NOCB of titled assets such as motor vehicles, boats, mobile
homes, and the like, also should be required to check the file, for a
number of reasons. First, assets of this type are particularly important
from the viewpoint of an unpaid creditor because they are the most
common leviable assets of any value individual debtors are likely to
own. Second, the risk of unfair surprise can be minimized for buyers of
these types of goods. Because perfected security interests must be noted
on the certificate of title, buyers may protect themselves against prior
secured creditors by noting that the certificate of title is clean. While
checking the title certificate would not alert a buyer or lender to the
judgment lien as illustrated in Bank of Hawthorne,43 the most common
buyers NOCB of such goods are dealers taking the vehicle in trade.
There is no severe burden in expecting professional buyers to check the
central file. The hardest call is this: Should non-professional innocent
buyers of titled goods be required to check the central file even though
the title certificate is clean? In my opinion, the answer should be yes
because the risk of unfair surprise can be minimized here. Everyone
who buys such titled goods must go to the DMV to transfer the title. In
the process, the DMV employee can easily check the central file and
inform the buyer of the judgment lien before the transfer is complete.
At that point, the buyer can decide whether to hope the judgment lienor
is not paying attention, negotiate with the seller for a reduced price, or
back out of the sale. Granted, there is risk here to gullible buyers who
are bamboozled into giving value before completing the transfer, but it
is no worse than the risk they take today, and hardly comparable to the
price of gullibility in other realms.
It would not be appropriate to protect lenders from the lien because
this would encourage conscious ignorance of the lien. One who extends
credit despite discovery of the lien would be in a worse position than
one who does not check. This would undermine the tendency of the lien
to encourage voluntary payment which I discuss below. Moreover, at
present, careful lenders either check for filed financing statements or
order credit reports. In doing so, they will discover any judgment liens.
Expecting them to do what they normally do is no hardship. In lending
against titled vehicles with clean certificates, checking the central file is
42. U.C.C. § 9-307(2) (1995).
43. See supra note 25.
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no great hardship. To this day, the Bank of Hawthorne probably checks
the sheriff's docket before lending against motor vehicles, which is no
less burdensome than checking the central file.
B. Diligent Creditors and the Statewide
Judgment Lien
In its simplest form, the centrally filed judgment lien has the
potential to make the build-up problem worse than it is today. If the
build-up of countywide writs serves to insulate debtors by deterring
diligent creditor activity within the county, a statewide build-up would
surely make this problem worse for two reasons. First, because a writ
can today normally be filed in only one county at a time, debtors who
own property in more than one county may have some writs filed in one
county and others filed in another, effectively diluting the build-up
effect in each county. If all writs were filed in the same place the buildup effect would be maximized. Second, and probably more important,
as I suggest below, the ease of central filing and the statewide reach of
the lien will make central filing more attractive than docketing in the
county. Together, centralization of liens combined with an increase in
the absolute number of liens will exacerbate the build-up effect and add
to the discouragement of diligent creditors.
The solution to the build-up problem here is to cause the liens of
inactive or passive creditors to lapse. There is nothing wrong with a
build-up of active creditors. There is no debtor insulation in such a case.
It is the build-up of passive liens that insulates the debtor from the
diligent creditor. After a specified amount of time, say, two years, an
unsatisfied statewide lien should lapse unless the creditor can demonstrate to a court that the lien remains unsatisfied despite continued
efforts to collect. On such showing, the court may order the lien
continued for another such specified period. It would not be desirable
to adopt a system for continuing the lien through a mere ministerial act
similar to the filing of an Article Nine continuation statement. This
would not assure that the build-up of valid liens was composed of active
creditors. Many passive lenders have systems in place for the periodic
recording of continuation statements. Of course, the lapse of the lien
would not deprive a creditor that has later found leviable property of the
right to levy. Any creditor with an unsatisfied judgment can always
levy. In such a case, the unfiled creditor would obtain an execution lien
on the property seized as of the moment of levy, subject, of course, to
any existing valid judgment liens.
The difficult call here is to select the proper duration of the lien prior
to lapse. How much time must pass before the build-up of too many
liens is likely? Again, I looked to the Alachua County docket for an
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indication. I discovered that approximately seventy-three percent of the
writs had been on file five years or more. An additional seventeen
percent had been on file for between two and five years, and the
remaining ten percent had been on file for less than two years. Thus, a
five-year lapse period would eliminate seventy-three percent of the
currently docketed writs, and a two-year lapse period would eliminate
ninety percent of them. If I am correct in predicting that central filing
will exacerbate the build-up phenomenon, these data suggest to me that
five years is too long a period to permit passive judgment lienors to
clog the record. Two years should be a long enough period in which to
proceed against the debtor in order to determine whether continued
pursuit will be worthwhile. If so, it would not be difficult to obtain a
court's order continuing the lien. Moreover, unless central filing causes
a dramatic increase in the number of judgment creditors who record, by
eliminating ninety percent of the currently docketed writs, a two-year
lapse period will largely eliminate the build-up problem.'
My proposal does not perfectly solve the build-up problem. There
still will be diligent creditors that are occasionally dismayed to
encounter prior existing judgment liens, particularly if the debtor
acquires a batch of them all at once. But the effect of lapse will be to
eliminate most of the passive liens. Moreover, time is on the side of the
diligent but patient creditor. At least if the debtor's leviable assets are
not disappearing, a new junior lienor can wait for the prior passive liens
to lapse leaving the coast clear.
C. Additional Advantages of the Statewide
Judgment Lien
One additional advantage of a centrally filed judgment lien is its
potential to encourage voluntary payment by the debtor. At present,
judgment creditors often don't bother to docket their writs with the
sheriff until they can direct the sheriff to leviable property in the county.
In contrast, the simple ministerial act of obtaining a judgment lien on
present and future realty by recording in the real estate records is
undertaken much more routinely. In time, because of the simplicity of
central filing and the statewide reach of the lien, filing centrally as to
personalty probably will become similarly routine. Moreover, because
of the ease of access to the central file, prospective landlords, prospective creditors, business people generally, and perhaps the occasional
consumer or blind date, will begin customarily to check the file before
44. Lapsing of liens should not be permitted to undermine the benefits of notoriety. The
lapse of a lien should not cause it to be removed from the record. People checking the record
still should be informed that the judgment remains unpaid.
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dealing with an unknown person or entity. In effect, statewide judgment
liens will have much greater notoriety than the current countywide liens.
For some debtors, this added constraint on the ability to do business will
provide added incentive to discharge these liens. If the debtor is honest
and bankruptcy is unattractive, the incentive will be to pay.
Another advantage of this proposal is that it eliminates the problem,
and the tactical conduct it engenders,45 of liens clicking on and off like
light bulbs as goods move from county to county. Creditors no longer
will have to fret over losing their place in line in one county in order to
pursue goods in another county.4 6 Creation of a true judgment lien also
will put to rest the current split of authority as to whether an unlevied
inchoate lien has priority over the trustee in bankruptcy.47
II.

CONCLUSION

The best way to reward diligent creditors and to protect innocent
purchasers or lenders is to adopt the lien-on-levy rule, but this creates
the risk of losing out to the trustee in bankruptcy if the levy forces the
debtor into bankruptcy. Just a few decades ago, this risk was not so
great, which explains why the great majority of states adopted it. Today,
however, the stigma of bankruptcy has all but disappeared, and
bankruptcy filings have topped one million per year. The risks of
bankruptcy now looms much larger than they did in years past.
45. One lawyer triumphantly told me this story. The debtor owned a valuable automobile,
but had built up a number of liens in his county of residence. The creditor happened to know
that the debtor also had season tickets to the Tampa Bay Buccaneers games, which are played
in Hillsborough county. The creditor's lawyer delivered a writ to the Hillborough County Sheriff,
the only writ delivered to the sheriff of that county, and levied on the car in the stadium parking
lot. A first priority lien was the result.
Under the current rule, a clever buyer who has discovered a build-up of writs could
presumably ask the debtor to deliver movable goods outside of the county. Once title has passed,
which normally occurs on delivery, the buyer could then return the goods to the original county
and the inchoate liens would not reattach.
Although these are the kinds of stories lawyers love to tell, well conceived rules of law do
not require such shenanigans.
46. The Special Committee on Post-Judgment Creditors' Remedies, see supra note *, is
currently considering alleviating this problem by recommending that the clerk of court be
authorized to issue multiple writs to different counties. This creates a potential risk that creditors
may be able to collect more than the outstanding debt. However, other devices, such as an action
in restitution or abuse of process, should suffice to protect against this abuse.
47. See In re Kolany, 49 B.R. 781, 782 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (holding that a creditor
must show delivery of writ and seizure of property to defeat trustee's § 544(a) power); Matter
of Gerstel, Inc., 65 B.R. 602 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that a judgment creditor must
deliver writ of execution to obtain priority in bankruptcy); see also In re Miele, 139 B.R. 296
(Bankr. D. N.J. 1992) (holding that an unlevied inchoate lien delivered to the sheriff more than
90 days before the petition was filed, was not subject to avoidance under § 544(a)).
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Ironically, this reality may now serve in some degree to deter creditor
activity in the majority states if creditors fear that levy will too readily
induce bankruptcy. My proposal strikes a balance that rewards most
diligent creditors, preserves the current protection against the trustee in
bankruptcy, protects buyers in the ordinary course from lien creditors,
provides a simple way for other bona fide buyers and lenders to protect
themselves, and may add incentive for the debtor to pay lien creditors
voluntarily. In all, it will be better law.
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